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Introduction 
This paper will attempt to explain how the Canadian Province of Prince 
Edward Island (PEl) can better use its jurisdictional capacity in relation 
to the policy area of jurisdictional autonomy. First of all, it is important 
to define what is meant by jurisdictional capacity and jurisdictional au-
tonomy. Capacity refers to the ability to do something whereas autonomy 
refers to the ability to act alone or without interference or help from 
another power. Both concepts are important for the Sub-National Island 
Jurisdictions (SNIJs) of the international community. All jurisdictions, 
SNIJ or otherwise, have the capacity to act but are also affected by other 
entities. Sovereign jurisdictions have the most power to act alone, but 
many work with other entities to achieve goals across a spectrum ranging 
in diversity from North Korea to EU member states (Bartmann, 2000; 
Connell, 1993; Hache, 2001). A SNIJ's pursuit of autonomy may relate 
to the goals its citizens have for the SNIJ society; it may not have an 
interest in a great amount of autonomy, or it may require autonomy to 
act in key policy areas in order to achieve certain aims (Kersell, 1992; 
Lim, 1997; Locke & Tomblin, 2003)' Its capacity to act may help it to 
achieve autonomy in these areas which will lead to the achievement of 
its societal goals. 
Prince Edward Island joined the federal nation of Canada in 1873, 
becoming its seventh province. The territories that made Canada had 
themselves been sub-national jurisdictions evolving from dependent 
colonies by acquiring aspects of jurisdictional autonomy from the par-
ent state, Great Britain, over time. By uniting together into a federation, 
they replaced the parent state with a federal government and were able to 
continue the transition toward full sovereignty. The advantage of federal-
ism was that it allowed the colonies to negotiate with each other the terms 
of the union. Of course, any negotiation involves bargaining, and PEl, 
like all the Canadian provinces, gave up certain parts of its (albeit lim-
ited) independence, but maintained authority in other areas of its society. 
The main characteristic of federalism is the dual affinity a citizen must 
acquire to both the federal state and the sub-national political unit. 
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The story of PEl's relationship to the Canadian federation is fascinat-
ing for students of Canadian history. From an Island Studies perspective, 
it is an intriguing tale involving colonialism, development, remoteness, 
isolation, identity, linkage, peripherality and dependence. Since cutting 
the colonial cord to Great Britain and connecting to the Canadian fed-
eration, PEl has benefited from giving parts of its powers to act to the 
federal government and has been deeply affected by the actions of the 
federal government. Its dependence is now profound - some 39% of 
PEl's revenue is funded directly by the federal government (Province 
of Prince Edward Island, 2005) - so that its viability as a jurisdiction, 
without the support of the federal government, is in question. This level 
of dependency may be eroding PEl's ability to operate autonomously in 
those areas where it has autonomy, as well as its confidence in operat-
ing as an equal and separate sub-national jurisdictional component of 
Canada. Ultimately, its identity as a unique and separate place may be at 
stake. By reviewing the situations of other SNIJs around the world, PEl 
may be able to learn lessons about its autonomy and capacity. 
Definitions 
Sub-National Island Jurisdiction: A territory existing in whole or in part 
on an island or group of islands that has not been recognized by the 
international community as a sovereign state, but has the capacity to 
govern some or all of its affairs without formal deference to any other 
jurisdictions. 
Jurisdiction: (1) A political unit usually associated with a territory. (2) 
The extent or area within which a government acts. 
Autonomy: The power, right or ability of a government to act of its 
sole volition without formal constraints within or on behalf of its juris-
diction. 
Capacity: The ability or the extent of a government's ability to govern 
affairs within or on behalf of its jurisdiction, often in relation to specific 
policy areas. 
Federalism: A system of government that uses at least two levels of 
authority. 
Branches of Government 
It is important to gain an understanding of what political capacities a Sllb-
National Island Jurisdiction (SNIJ) has at its disposal. It is important to 
ascertain where the concepts of autonomy and capacity overlap, and why 
it is possible to have capacity in the policy area of autonomy. To do all of 
that involves understanding the components that make up governmental 
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authority and looking at the many forms of governmental authority in 
the sub-national realm. 
In politieal science, it is generally agreed that, even considering the 
many demo era tic and non-democratie forms known, there are three 
functions or branehes of government. These are Legislative, Exeeutive 
and Judicial. The first relates to the creation oflaws; the second to the ear-
rying out of action within these laws, and the third to the interpretation 
of the laws and the interpretation of the actions in relation to the laws. A 
nation-state has complete autonomous authority to design, develop and 
alter these funetions of state within its borders without input from any 
external body. This is known as sovereignty. \Vhile a nation-state has full 
sovereignty, a SNIJ lacks a measure of authority over one or more aspeets 
of one or more of the three branches of government, deferring to a na-
tional power with which it has affiliation. Even while it laeks a measure 
of authority in one way or more, it possesses a measure of authority in 
one or more other areas of government. 
PEl has capaeity in the three branches of government - legislative, 
exeeutive and judieial. For the most part, these powers are shared with 
the national or Federal government of Canada. In some aspeets, though, 
PEl ean act exclusively, and in others, it cannot act at all. If we assume 
that PEl has certain aims and requires autonomous authority in some 
policy areas to get to these ends, what capaeities of the three branches of 
government ean it use? Is it using its full range of powers? Can PEl learn 
from other, similar, SNIJs about how best to use its eapacities? Looking 
at other SNIJs should help determine if SNIJs ean be eategorized and 
in what category PEl fits. 
Categories of Sub-National Island Jurisdictions (sNljs) 
A trait of SNIJs relates to their role in the metropolitan state government. 
Some SNIJs merely funetion as an administrative unit whose seope is 
outlined by a higher power. Others have a full range oflegislative, exeeu-
tive and judieial powers except, say, national defenee or foreign affairs, 
but have no formal representation in the national government. And yet 
others have eapacities in all funetions of government and also a say in 
the national government. This is known as federalism. PEl is a part of 
the Canadian federation, and there are many other island examples of 
this form of government. 
By eategorizing SNIJs, better eomparisons might be possible. From 
good comparative cases, better lessons for PEl ean be learned. PEl has 
unique eeonomie and politieal eapaeities; diseerning where it fits into 
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the pantheon of existing sub-national forms of autonomy will assist it in 
assessing and accessing its full range of jurisdictional authority. 
I differentiate my SNIJ categories from those listed by Ronald Watts 
(Watts, 2000). One reason I argue for doing this is that his categories 
are general to all types of jurisdictions of the World and not specifically 
island-based. While vVatts' categories are very useful, my main interest 
is highlighting SNIJs that have capacitics in the three areas of govern-
ment and using these to compare to PEL Watts' categories are useful in 
categorizing PEl as a unit of a federal state but I wonder if this is too lim-
ited to the political (i.e. legislative & executive) realm and discounts the 
capacities involved in the judicial branch. Moreover, while the ideas of 
shared capacities are interesting, I think abilities to act on some settings 
in concert or at the same time that another actor is acting in the same 
setting is far different than the ability to act alone or autonomously. 
Watts (and subsequently Baldacchino and Milne, 2006) discusses a 
taxonomy of six varieties of sub-national manifestation: Unions, Constitu-
tionally Decentralized Unions, Federations, Confederations, Federacies 
and Associated States. He counts twenty island-states within sovereign 
federations, ten in federacy relationships, eighteen that have some form of 
home rule and three that are associated states oflarger sovereign nations. 
It is interesting to note, though, the high number of islands involved in 
non-unitary states. These federal or federal-type polities emerged as a 
political method of bringing together divergent groups or regions within 
one territory. By creating two or more levels of government, geographic 
(or other) cleavages could be overcome. The federal structure provided 
the necessary balance that bridged the cleavages with a national govern-
ment but allowed some autonomy in the local jurisdictions. 
Both the Watts and the Baldacchino & Milne taxonomies work sat-
isfactorily to describe the various kinds of affiliations that are possible 
for sub-national relationships, whether federal or quasi-federal, and my 
recapitulating them would neither advance an understanding of these 
various forms nor advance what PEl can learn from other SNIJs. Suf-
fice it to say that there are differences among the types, and it is my own 
contention that PEl can best learn from others within its own type. vVatts 
lists Tierra del Fuego/Argentina, Tasmania/Australia, Newfoundland/ 
Canada, PEI/Canada, Hawaii/USA, Balearics/Spain, Canaries/Spain, 
Nevis/St. Kitts, Comoros, Malaysia and Micronesia as the examples of 
island-states in federations. 
In thinking about the best way to compare PEl among SNIJs, I think 
it is useful to draw a further distinction between island federations and 
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islands that are in federations because there is a difference between relat-
ing as islands to each other and relating as islands to a mainland power; 
islands share a geographical commonality but islands and mainlands 
do not. Many island nations (whether fully sovereign or not) are archi-
pelagoes. Although the system of government of these archipelagoes is 
systemically similar to mainland federal states like the United States, the 
fact of their islandness, or indeed, their archipelagic nature, creates signif-
icant differences in the way that the federal state can operate, particularly 
in the area of public administration and the delivery of public services 
(Wettenhall, 1992). In other words, federal states that are composed of 
only islands are different from federal states that are composed of only 
or mostly mainland units. We can thus whittle Watts' list down to Tierra 
del Fuego, Tasmania, Newfoundland, PEl, Hawaii, Balearics, Canaries 
and Malaysia. It could be further argued that Tierra del Fuego (as it is 
an island divided between Chile and Argentina), Newfoundland (as it is 
a jurisdiction composed of an island and a mainland area), and Sabah 
and Sarawak, the two island-based provinces of Malaysia (as they occupy 
only a portion of the island of Borneo), also make for poor comparisons 
to PEL In short, I think the best comparisons for PEl are the exclusively 
island jurisdictions that are subordinate to a mainland federal power. 
A more important distinction between the type of SNIJ PEl is and 
other kinds of SNIJs relates to capacities around the three branches of 
government mentioned above. Most political jurisdictions, whether is-
land based or not, have some capacity to act; this is almost the very 
qualification that makes them jurisdictions. Any kind of municipality or 
county has the ability to administer or act in certain areas, and, generally 
speaking, this is under the Executive branch of government. However, 
executive powers do not necessarily correlate to any legislative powers in 
a jurisdiction. Some administrations or executive branches are answer-
able to authority outside the jurisdiction. On the other hand, some are 
responsible to legislative authority within the jurisdiction which gives 
the jurisdiction the decision-making ability over what it will administer 
and how. Thus, we have already divided the world's islands into those 
that can make decisions and those that can merely carry out instructions. 
The Jurisdiction Project has made a choice that it is concerned with is-
land jurisdictions and autonomy. Those places that have only executive 
powers have no autonomy whereas those that have legislative authority 
have, in varying forms and degrees, some autonomy. SNIJs that have both 
executive and legislative powers are sometimes referred to as possessing 
"self-government". 
Hans Connor - 39 
Pulling Strings 
Prior to the idea of self-government, there arose the notion of"respon-
sible government" toward the end of the colonial era. Colonies them-
selves were a form of sub-national jurisdiction, and responsible govern-
ment was a method to make colonial governments more accountable to 
the residents of the colony rather than to the metropolitan power. This 
had the consequent effect of giving such colonies more independence 
from the parent-state. The Dominion of Canada itself is an example of 
a colony that, beginning with the attainment of responsible government, 
over its history became more independent from its colonial parent, cul-
minating in complete substantial and symbolic sovereignty in 1982 with 
the repatriation of its constitution. PEl was also involved in this process. 
Interestingly, the progress toward full sovereignty was accompanied by a 
progressive increase in democratic rights. It could be argued, then, that, 
as far as they are responsible to their internal constituencies rather than 
to a parent-state, SNIJs that possess more autonomy are more demo-
cratic than those that do not. If this is so, then that gives the actions of 
the more autonomous island governments in the area of legislative and 
executive power a considerable amount of credibility and legitimacy, 
especially compared to less autonomous (less democratic) SNIJs. Interest-
ingly, many of the most autonomous SNIJs have exercised the democratic 
choice not to secure full sovereignty. 
Existing (at least in theory) outside the political realm of the other 
two branches of government, the third branch, the judiciary, is perhaps 
the least understood aspect in relation to SNIJs. If a jurisdiction has an 
internal judicial branch along with executive and legislative powers, it 
can not only administer and decide on its own affairs but it can interpret 
the appropriateness of its own actions for itself. In many SNIJs, the judi-
ciary interprets and applies laws from the metropolitan power. In the case 
of some others, including PEl, the judiciary also applies and interprets 
laws that are homegrown and intended only for home use. While the 
courts of many SNIJs have a great deal of independent authority (not only 
from the other branches of government but also from the metropolitan 
power), there appears to be no SNIJ where the judiciary is not subject to 
appeal to a higher continental court (Baldacchino, 2oo6b). Indeed, one 
may deduce that one of the main advantages of SNIJs is the protection 
of their citizens by metropolitan courts with all the history and reputa-
tion that comes along. At the same time, as long as a right of appeal to 
a court outside the jurisdiction exists, full autonomy in a SNIJ cannot 
be said to be present. 
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When PEl was a separate colony, Islanders could pursue legal action 
to the ultimate authority of the UK government's Privy Council; now, as a 
province of Canada, the final judicial authority is the Supreme Court of 
Canada. However, it does have independent judicial capacity to a point. 
Thus, another way to categorize SNIJs is as between those that have 
practically full judicial capacity and those that have none. 
Finally, a key difference among the federal kind of SNIJs and others 
is that entities within federal systems have some kind of representation in 
the authority of the larger federal framework, usually through some kind 
of elected chamber, giving the SNI] residents affiliation at two levels and 
conferring responsibility for the citizens on not just the island level but 
also on the federal level. This gives these kinds ofSNIJ citizens two kinds 
of power unlike other islands who, either by choice or through the op-
eration of history, have no voice in the metropolitan government. Again, 
this is advantageous to such islands because, aside from autonomy to act 
within their own jurisdiction, they have a presence in the government 
of the metropolitan power that is the limiter of its autonomy. PEl, for 
example, sends eight representatives to the two chambers in the federal 
parliament of Canada while the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico sends 
no representatives to the USA Congress even though it is subject to its 
authority. 
In sum, PEl can be characterized as a SNIJ that: (a) has some capacity 
in all three branches of government; it has some independent capacity 
in the executive and legislative functions, some shared capacity in some 
areas of these functions and must relinquish total capacity to the federal 
authorities in some other areas. (b) Its judiciary has some independent 
capacity in some areas but is subordinate to a higher metropolitan court. 
(c) It is not part of an archipelagic federation but rather is an island as-
sociated with a metropolitan federal power that is continentally based. 
(d) PEl is exclusively an island jurisdiction with no subject territory on 
a mainland. (e) The jurisdiction covers the entire geographic area of 
the island. (f) PEl has representation in the federal government of the 
metropolitan mainland. 
Of course, no two islands are alike and many islands that do not 
possess these six traits have similarities to PEL However, in relation to 
jurisdictional capacity, it is the other Sub-National Island Jurisdictions 
that also have these traits that, I suggest, make the best points of com-
parison from which PEl may draw lessons for maximizing its potential 
autonomy. This group would include Hawaii, Tasmania and the autono-
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mous archipelagoes of Spain, the Balearic Islands and Canary Islands. 
For my purposes, the island of Tasmania, whose cultural history is so 
similar to that of PEl's, is the most preferred comparison. 
Powers of the Province of Prince Edward Island 
As mentioned, PEl has autonomous capacity in some areas of the execu-
tive, legislative and judicial branches of government but also has some 
shared capacities in some areas and no capacity in yet other areas. As also 
mentioned, PEl had been a colony of the British Empire. When it gave 
up this status to join Canada as a provincial partner in the federation, it 
negotiated entry with the government of Canada. The form of this con-
tract is its agreement to an amended British North America Act (which 
subsequently became the Constitution Act of Canada). This document 
is the basis for PEl's capacities and provides an extensive list of powers 
that are provincial and powers that are federal, and hints at those that 
may be shared (Elazar, 1994). 
Sections 91 to 95 of the constitution specifically assign jurisdiction 
as between federal and provincial governments. The provincial govern-
ment of PEl has power to directly tax within the province and borrow 
money on the sole credit of the province. It can establish the framework 
of its own government. It is responsible for municipal government. Also, 
the system of education is under the exclusive authority of the province. 
Other areas of exclusive provincial authority include inter-provincial 
trade; public lands belonging to the province; forestry resources and 
the taxation thereof; non-renewable natural resources and the taxation 
thereof; energy production, regulation and the taxation thereof; hospitals, 
asylums and charities; shops, taverns and other retailers; local works and 
undertakings; incorporations, property rights and civil rights; and, finally, 
matters merely local in nature. 
There is concurrent federal/provincial jurisdiction in the areas of old 
age pensions, agriculture and immigration. The federal government has 
authority for - but there are provisions for provincial input - in the areas 
of marriage and divorce, treaty implementation, foreign loans, exter-
nal trade, inland waterways, railways and telecommunications. As well, 
while certain segments of the justice system are assigned to provincial 
jurisdiction, the overall legal and justice framework, from administra-
tion to judicial appointment to punishment, is a patchwork of shared 
responsibility between both federal and provincial level. Tellingly though, 
where provincial laws and federal laws clash, it was agreed that federal 
law should prevail. 
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The federal government has sole power in matters of national se-
curity and defence, foreign policy, citizenship, communications, intel-
lectual property, shipping, navigation and maritime and oceanic affairs, 
transportation, trade and commerce, currency and coinage, banking 
and affairs related to Indian reserves and relations with First Nations. 
Of most significance is the provision that for any matter not specifically 
mentioned, the federal government shall have the authority and respon-
sibility to deal with it. Not only has this given the federal government 
its "residual power" over a number of unforeseen aspects of society that 
have arisen since the British North America Act terms were first drafted, 
but also the very notion that the federal government should be the de-
fault authority slants the constitutional dialectic in Canada in favour of 
federal supremacy. 
Some Prince Edward Islanders have found this extremely problem-
atic. A former PEl Premier, the late J. Angus MacLean, held that PEl 
had had a strong independent character as a colony which was in danger 
of being overwhelmed within the larger identity of emerging Canadian 
identity. To prevent this, he called for the constitution to have clearly 
defined areas of jurisdiction with neither level of government being su-
perior or inferior to other, but totally sovereign within those specific areas. 
Moreover, he called for the autonomy of the provincial level of govern-
ment to be protected from any unilateral action by the federal govern-
ment (MacLean, 1981). Similarly, PEl political scientist David Milne saw 
constitutionalism as not only assigning local powers and capacities but 
also as crafting the nature of sub-national identity. In adopting federa-
tion with Canada, PEl accepted a dual affiliation (as mentioned above) 
that eroded its independent identity (mentioned by MacLean). Federa-
tion, said Milne, scripts both separation of powers and integration into 
a larger whole (Milne, 2000). In Canada, where the integration meant 
(along with many other things) subordination in a constitutional sense, 
this script may have contributed to a stereotype of political dependence 
(arising from the constitutional arrangements) that has had a chronic 
negative impact on the Island psyche (Milne, 1992). 
The Tasmania Comparison 
Kenneth Wiltshire suggests that, as the smallest part of the Australian 
federation, the island state of Tasmania has a strong resemblance to the 
small provinces of Canada such as PEl (Wiltshire, 1986: 89)' The two 
islands have many jurisdictional similarities as discussed above. However, 
the nature of their federal relationships is somewhat different. 
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The main teehnieal differenee between Australian and Canadian 
federalism is that in Australia, residual powers fall to the provinees. The 
theory is that elements of government or soeiety that were unspeeified 
in the eonstitution eould form a vast jurisdictional landscape in whieh 
the Australian state would be the authority and would tip the balance of 
Australian federalism toward the states. However, if a state law is found 
to be inconsistent with federal law, then the federal law prevails. 
Of the powers mentioned in the Australian constitution, the federal 
government is responsible for interstate and external trade, commerce 
and shipping, currency and eoinage, defence, external affairs, trading 
and financial corporations, communications, old age pensions and un-
employment benefits. The states, sueh as Tasmania, have responsibility 
for edueation, health, hospitals, law, order and public safety, railways and 
transport, and public utilities. Eaeh state has a court system that may 
adjudicate matters within state jurisdiction but a federal court system 
deals with federal matters. The Australian High Court is the last resort 
of appeal from all state or federal venues (Elazar, 1994). 
The main practical differenee between Tasmania and PEl appears 
only slight in considering their federal eonstitutions technically. As 
mentioned, Canadian provinees have the power to levy taxes and raise 
revenue. By contrast, Australian states do not. This led, over the course 
of the last half-eentury, to substantial centralization in Australia and the 
ascendaney of the national government in affairs (Elazar, 1994: 20). Inter-
estingly, over the same period, the government in Canada also became 
more centralized and made substantial intrusions into provincial affairs 
despite the relative finaneial independence of the Canadian provinees. 
vVhat this meant for both PEl and Tasmania was dependence on federal 
funding. This also shows the importanee of revenue as an ingredient in 
jurisdietional autonomy whether or not it is a constitutionally-specified 
power. 
Fiscal Powers 
All things eonsidered, Prince Edward Island appears to have many tech-
nieal advantages in governanee eompared to other SNIJs. Its government 
has at least some capaeity in all three branches of government plus its 
residents have representation in the metropolitan government with which 
the province shares capacity in a number of policy areas. Even more im-
portant, from a practieal standpoint, the province of PEl has the power 
to generate revenue. 
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In the areas of personal income tax, corporate income tax, sales tax, 
property tax and taxes on resources, PEl can levy and receive tax and set 
the tax rates. Most economists assume that one purpose of tax in a society 
is to redistribute revcnue or income for a variety of societal reasons and 
goals. In Canada, the federal government also has jurisdiction in the area 
of tax and, due to the country's economic size and strength, generates 
substantial revenues that allows it to pursue redistributive goals, taxing 
heavily here or funding particular programs there (Boadway and Flat-
ters, 1982). An example of taxing to achieve a policy goal may be seen in 
the area of tobacco sales. In an effort to decrease smoking for the sake 
of better community health, the federal government makes increased 
taxes a disincentive to the purchase of tobacco products. As an example 
of funding of programs, the federal government may expend its funds 
in the area of higher education through an extensive system of research 
grants involving universities, faculty and students in order to improve the 
overall system of higher education throughout the nation, whether or not 
education is technically a federal power under the Constitution. 
If the provincial government strongly agrees with these goals, it can 
tax and/or spend in the same policy areas. If it feels neutral, it may simply 
formally agree to taxing/spending in areas where jurisdiction is shared 
or provincial in nature. If the provincial and federal goals are in conflict, 
PEl has substantial freedom to tax and/or spend within its jurisdiction to 
achieve its own goals. By contrast, as mentioned, Tasmania does not have 
this fiscal freedom; yet, both island polities have substantial problems of 
dependency on the federal government. In Tasmania's case, it is more 
understandable because of the lack of redistributive power. However, 
in the case of PEl, it may indicate a failure to fully flex its taxing and 
spending muscles. 
In some areas, PEl does exercise its fiscal powers, for example, by 
requiring non-residents to pay twice the property tax of resident property 
owners. This limits the encroachment of off-Island interests into the 
landscape and economy of the province, bolstering local businesses and 
tourism values and allaying deep-seated island-specific fears of subjection 
to off-island control. However, due to the real benefits of federal spending 
in the province, combined with the imposing power of the federal gov-
ernment's financial strength, PEl has generally lacked the will and/or the 
need to aggressively and creatively access its fiscal capabilities. Perhaps, 
the fear that the pursuit of independent goals would conflict with federal 
aims has also been a boundary. Interestingly, though, a number of writers 
Hans Connor - 45 
Pulling Strings 
(see Buker, 2005; Seidle, 1991; Wiltshire, 1986; Boadway anel Flatters, 1982; 
Simeon, 1972) suggest that the levels of taxing and spending as well the 
goals of same are a matter of federal-provincial discussion and negotia-
tion. Indeed, the terms of PEl's entry into the Canadian Confederation 
can be seen as an independent colony giving up much of its autonomy for 
a monetary bail-out. While this may have given the federal government 
the historical negotiation leverage, leading to a culture of dependency, 
it did not remove the fiscal tools available that many SNIJs (including 
Tasmania) never had the benefit of; nor did it remove the technical fact 
that negotiations between levels of government are a feature of federal 
systems. This fact has prompted some PEl observers to call for a renewed 
spirit of bargaining position assertiveness on the part of the province (see 
Carroll, 2000; MacLauchlan, 1992). 
Informal Powers 
In exploring the range and limits of the technical powers of PEl found in 
the constitutional framework of the Canadian federation and the extent 
of PEl's fiscal powers, we were led to the gap between these capabilities 
and the inability of PEl to break patterns of dependence. While federal-
ism is a formal structure of governance that balances local and national 
interests, the Canadian reality is that a variety of factors have given more 
weight to the federal side of the balance and, in the case of island ju-
risdictions like PEl and Tasmania, is exacerbated by their relative size 
and isolation. In spite of these supposed weaknesses and the consequent 
history of reliance on federal benevolence, the federal system inevitably 
and ultimately allows for the maintenance of full sub-national jurisdic-
tional status that provides a number of political resources useable in the 
on-going roundtable that is federalism. Vve now turn to the question of 
whether these political resources can fill the above-mentioned gap. 
Canadian federalism scholar Richard Simeon contends that such 
political resources are not tangible (unlike those listed in a constitution) 
but are dependent on the beliefs of the participants in federal conversa-
tions. Consequently, the extent of political resources may vary greatly 
from issue to issue. While some political resources derive from powers 
found in documents, they are mostly perception-based. In discussing 
federal-provincial relationships and interplay, he enumerates the follow-
ing resources that the players may draw upon (Simeon, 1972: 201-220): 
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1. Legal Authority is a resource derived from the constitu-
tion and other laws. It arises when an initiative involves 
the constitutional rights of the other level of government or 
requires its cooperation. In such a case, the party responding 
to the initiative controls actions within its legal limits and 
hence has resources. Where more cooperation is required, 
the resources are greater. 
2. Public Support is a political resource that involves not only 
assessing and capitalizing on the mood of thc public but also 
a measurement of the influence the respective governments 
hold over their electorates. Public support for its goals gives 
a province the resources to achieve these goals; but these 
resources are diminished if the public also supports compet-
ing federal goals. 
3. Technical Skills among government officials about how to 
achieve policy goals, how to utilize the policy tools available 
and indeed how to manage the federal-provincial relation-
ship is a resource that is less capricious than public support 
and less fixed than legal authority; it can be built up and 
built upon. 
4. Political Skills: Related to technical skills is the resource 
of the political skills of politicians and government officials 
associated with the ability to persuade others, manage situ-
ations and strategically exploit resources. 
5. Objective Information, from statistical reports, scholarly 
publications or other types of research is a political re-
source. 
6. Population Size: A province's population size is a resource 
that can be used as leverage in negotiating with the feder-
al government because population size usually translates 
into votes. 
7. Relative Wealth is both a positive for wealthy provinces 
allowing them to contribute financial resources to a situ-
ation or issue and also a strength-in-weakncss for poorer 
provinces that get more attention in negotiating with the 
federal government due to their more dire need. 
S. Procedures and Rules of the Game are resources that can 
be used as processual tools in gaining control of the agenda 
of federal-provincial negotiations or creating a new set of 
procedures by which a player may hope negotiations ensue. 
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That Simeon sees many of such political factors as both a resource 
as well as a constraint is particularly interesting for islands which are 
increasingly known for finding advantagc in supposed vulnerability (Bal-
dacchino, 2006a). Certainly, a lack of economic strength has been an 
advantage for PEl in receiving fiscal transfers from the federal govern-
ment. As well, its small size and relative isolation may be advantageous 
in solidifying public sentiment for a provincial endeavour, such as the 
construction of the Confederation Bridge. However, one must wonder 
whether all the possible political resources have been fully maximized 
since, as in relation to the fiscal powers mentioned above, dependence 
on federal benevolence continues. If federal-provincial relations are a 
negotiation, the bargaining positions are still lopsided in favour of the 
federal government. 
Of course, this assumes that PEl wants to end its history of depen-
dence. In fact, no such goal has been evident and it could be argued that, 
despite any proclamations to the contrary, PEl has been quite adept at 
federal-provincial negotiations in obtaining federal munificence. This 
is partly due to the relative weight of PEl's representation in the federal 
government. It has four members in the House of Commons, and in the 
upper parliamentary chamber, the Senate, it has four members, both of 
which are well beyond norms of representation by population given PEl's 
small number of citizens. In addition, there is a federal government con-
vention that calls for each province to have representation in the cabinet, 
the federal executive branch. Again, this is disproportionate to its size 
compared to the other provinces. With such rclatively large representa-
tion in the federal halls of power, PEl has excellent access to the federal 
agenda and the benefits flowing from involvement in controlling the 
federal agenda. If the goal is to receive federal generosity and maintain 
the federal connection, PEl is politically better placed than any other 
province and indeed any other SNIJ. 
Connected to the relative weight of PEl's federal representation is an-
other factor that contributes to PEl's proficiency in the realm of Canadian 
federal-provincial relations. The Island's unique political culture, which 
is a function of its island character, is a resource that has enabled its ac-
cess to federal largesse. While the structure of government in Canada has 
facilitated PEl's access to federal resources, it is the traits found within 
its political culture that has maximized the access. 
Due to its small size, PEl was not able to develop an internal govern-
ment structure that could be elevated beyond the personal. This meant 
that, rather than technical expertise, PEl bureaucrats and politicians 
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gained proficiency at linking personal relationships to policy goals and 
vice versa. In PEl, ministers of the crown may get personally involved in 
issues in ways not practical or expected in any other province. Peter Buker 
discusses some of the pitfalls of this situation but also notes personal 
ministerial involvement has been effective for PEl in intergovernmental 
affairs (Buker, 2005). Tying this proficiency back to Simeon's listing, it 
can be said that PEl's political culture gives it political resources from its 
Political Skills, Small Size and Relative Wealth. As mentioned, it is debat-
able, at least, as to whether PEl uses these resources for anything more 
than getting federal largesse. If we have other goals as a province, includ-
ing self-sufficiency, then better use of all resources may be required. 
Conclusion 
Indeed, Island Studies Professor Godfrey Baldacchino has identified key 
policy areas where islands should strengthen their capabilities to increase 
their prospects for development (Baldacchino, 2004). Among these is the 
capacity for increased political autonomy in any policy areas available 
to SNlJs. PEl has a comparatively large set of capacities. It has extensive 
formal powers and powerful fiscal capacity. As a province of Canada, it 
is involved in on-going intra-national diplomacy which involves accessing 
informal powers to improve its self-sufficiency and obtain benefits from 
the metropolis. It has been argued that it is quite adept at the latter. In 
order to improve its self-sufficiency, it must more fully access the other 
under-utilized informal capabilities to, at least, increase its proficiency 
in accessing its full range of resources whether political, fiscal or consti-
tutional. The ability to increase the above jurisdictional capacities can 
serve as a foundation for developing abilities to increase proficiency and 
self-sufficiency in the other policy areas that are part of the Jurisdiction 
Project. 
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